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Abstract. The most effective treatment for kidney failure that is currently
known is transplantation. As the number of cadaveric donors is not sufficient
and kidneys from living donors are often not suitable for immunological reasons,
there are attempts to organize exchanges between patient-donor pairs. In this
paper we model this situation as a cooperative game and propose some algorithms
for finding a solution.
Keywords. Kidney transplantation, cooperative game, Pareto optimal solution,
core, algorithm. Mathematical subjects classification. 91B68, 68Q25
1 Introduction
Renal failure is a very serious illness for which the most effective treatment that
is currently known is kidney transplantation. Ideally, a kidney from a deceased
donor could be used, but the supply of those in spite of joint efforts of national
and even international organisations (for example Eurotransplant Foundation
[19] and the United Network for Organ Sharing in the USA [20]) is not sufficient
for the growing demand and the waiting time of a patient is unpredictable. As
the operation techniques improved and the risk for a living donor of a kidney
(a genetic or an emotional relative of the patient) was minimized, the number
of live-donor transplantations increased. Moreover, some studies [18] show that
grafts from living donors have a higher survival rate.
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For a transplantation to be successful, some immunological requirements must
be fulfilled. Basically, ABO incompatibility and a positive cross-match are an
absolute contraindication, moreover, the greater the number of HLA mismatches
between the donor and the recipient, the greater the chance of rejection [9].
Hence, it often happens that a willing donor cannot donate his/her kidney to the
intended recipient. Therefore in several countries systematic kidney exchange
programs have been established: in Romania [11], the Netherlands [10], USA
[14, 15, 16]; in other cases there are isolated examples (in the Middle East [7]).
Kidney exchange (KE for short) is still a controversial issue, however the aim
of this paper is not to discuss the ethical and legal aspects of this concept. In spite
of some pessimistic expectations (the British Transplantation Society estimated
potential benefits from living donors’ exchanges to be around 3% [3]), in an
institute of Romania the monthly mean number of transplantations increased
from 4.2 to 6.1 since the KE program started [11] and a simulation study using
real USA statistical data revealed that the utilization of kidneys from living
donors without exchanges was around 55%, whilst with exchanges it increased to
91% when the size of the simulated population was 300 [14].
We follow the approach started in [14] and [15], in that we represent KE as a
cooperative game, in which patient-donor pairs seek cyclic exchanges of kidneys.
Since all operations on a cycle should be performed simultaneously (to avoid
the risk that one of the donors will withdraw his or her commitment after the
others have undergone nephrectomy [7]), cycles should be as short as possible for
logistical reasons. Therefore we directly incorporate cycle lengths into preference
models (notice that in [14] the obtained cycle lengths were just observed after
simulations of the algorithm used, and in [16] the number of matched patients
was derived as a function of the maximum allowed cycle length). Further, besides
Pareto optimal solutions we also consider the core and the strict core of the
KE game. We conclude with computational complexity considerations of the
proposed algorithms and some open questions.
2 The KE game
An instance of the KE game is represented by a directed graph G = (V,A) where
each vertex v ∈ V corresponds to a patient and his intended (incompatible)
donor (or donors). A pair (i, j) ∈ A if the patient corresponding to vertex i can
accept a kidney from a donor corresponding to vertex j. (Hence, if patient i
has a compatible donor, (i, i) ∈ A.) Moreover, for each vertex i there is a linear
ordering ≤i on the set of endvertices of arcs incident from i. This ordering is
represented by a preference list of i and we assume that i is the last entry in each
preference list. If j ≤i k and simultaneously k ≤i j, we say that i is indifferent
between j and k, or that j and k are tied in i’s preference list, and write j ∼i k; if
j ≤i k but not k ≤i j, then i strictly prefers j to k, and we write j <i k. Hence,
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in general, preference lists may contain ties.
Definition 1 A kidney exchange game (KE game for short) is a triple Γ =
(V,G,O), where V is the set of players, G is a digraph with a vertex set V and
O = {≤i; i ∈ V }.
Definition 2 A solution of the KE game Γ = (V,G,O) is a permutation pi of
V such that i 6= pi(i) implies (i, pi(i)) ∈ A for each i ∈ V . If (i, pi(i)) ∈ A, we
say that i is covered by pi, otherwise i is uncovered. A player i is assigned in a
solution pi the pair (pi(i), Cpi(i)), where Cpi(i) denotes the cycle of pi containing i.
A player evaluates a permutation not only according to the player he is as-
signed to, but he also takes into account the cycle length. This is expressed by
the following extension of preferences from O to preferences over (player,cycle)
pairs. The same symbol is used for preferences over players as well as over pairs
and permutations.
Definition 3 A player i prefers pair (j,M) to pair (k,N) if
(i) j <i k or
(ii) j ∼i k and |M | ≤ |N |.
Definition 4 A coalition S ⊆ V weakly blocks a solution pi if there exists a
permutation σ of S such that
(i) (σ(i), Cσ(i)) ≤i (pi(i), Cpi(i)) for each i ∈ S and
(ii) (σ(j), Cσ(j)) <j (pi(j), C
pi(j)) for at least one j ∈ S.
A coalition S ⊆ V blocks a solution pi if there exists a permutation σ of S such
that (σ(i), Cσ(i)) <i (pi(i), C
pi(i)) for each i ∈ S.
Now we define the studied solution concepts.
Definition 5 A permutation pi is Pareto optimal for game Γ (belongs to PO(Γ)
for short) if the grand coalition V does not block; it is strongly Pareto optimal
(pi ∈ SPO(Γ) for short) if V does not weakly block.
Definition 6 A permutation pi is in the core C(Γ) of game Γ if no coalition
blocks pi and pi is the strong core SC(Γ) of Γ if no coalition weakly blocks.
Notice that our concepts of strongly Pareto optimal and Pareto optimal so-
lutions correspond to what are usually called Pareto optimal and weakly Pareto
optimal solutions respectively [14]. However, we use the first two terms to make
the terminology consistent within this paper.
As each blocking coalition is also weakly blocking, we have SC(Γ) ⊆ C(Γ) ⊆
PO(Γ) and SC(Γ) ⊆ SPO(Γ) ⊆ PO(Γ) in general, but the inclusion C(Γ) ⊆
SPO(Γ) is not always true even in the case without indifferences.
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Consider the KE game Γ given by the digraph to the left,
where the first entries in the preference lists are denoted
by solid lines, while the second entries correspond to dot-
ted lines. Permutation pi = (1, 2, 3)(4, 5, 6) is in C(Γ),
but pi /∈ SPO(Γ), as the grand coalition weakly blocks
pi by considering permutation σ = (1, 2, 4)(5, 6, 3).
However, in the practical kidney exchange application it
is not clear which solution concept is the most suitable
one.
3 The case with preferences
With no indifferences, the famous Top Trading Cycles (TTC for short) algorithm
(Figure 1) can be used for the KE game. The TTC algorithm was originally
proposed by Gale in [17] for housing markets, where cycle lengths were not taken
into account. It was shown that the TTC algorithm outputs a permutation in
the core of the housing market also in the case with indifferences (ties are broken
arbitarily). In [13] Roth and Postlewaite proved that if there are no indifferences,
the strong core of the housing market is nonempty and contains a unique per-
mutation. Further, Roth [12] proved that the TTC algorithm is strategy-proof.
However, a detailed consideration of algorithmic questions connected with the
TTC algorithm is quite recent; in [1] its implementation with O(m) time com-
plexity was proposed, where m is the number of arcs in G. In [6], the TTC
algorithm is called Algorithm B-stable and it was shown that in the case with no
indifferences, its output is in SC(Γ).
Input. KE game Γ = (V,G,O). Output. A permutation pi = C1C2 . . . Cr of V .
Step 0. N := V , round r := 0.
Step 1. Choose an arbitrary player i0.
Step 2. Player i0 points to his favourite i1 in N . i1 points to his favourite i2 in
N etc. A cycle arises or player ik cannot point.
Step 3. r := r+1. If a cycle C was obtained, then Cr := C, otherwise Cr = (ik).
N := N − Cr.
Step 4. If N 6= ∅, go to Step 1, otherwise end.
Figure 1: The Top Trading Cycles (TTC) Algorithm.
However, the TTC algorithm may fail to find a permutation in the C(Γ) and
also in PO(Γ) if indifferences are present. In the example in the next page, the
TTC algorithm may, depending on how the ties in vertices 1 and 3 are broken,
output the permutation (1, 2, 3, 4), while here SPO(Γ) = PO(Γ) = C(Γ) =
SC(Γ) and they contain a unique permutation (1, 4)(2, 3).
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ferences it is NP-complete to decide whether C(Γ) 6= ∅,
and it is also NP-complete to decide whether SC(Γ) 6= ∅.
Notice that it is always the case that SPO(Γ) 6= ∅: if we
define a partial order on the set of all permutations of V
by setting σ ≤ pi if (σ(i), Cσ(i)) ≤i (pi(i), Cpi(i)) for each
player, then the minimal permutations in this partial order are strongly Pareto
optimal (and hence also Pareto optimal). We show later, however, that it is
NP-hard to find a permutation in SPO(Γ) (Theorem 5).
4 The Simple KE game
Let us now suppose that all compatible kidneys are equally suitable for trans-
plantation, as suggested in [15] and [16]. We will say that now the players have
dichotomous preferences (we follow the terminology of [2]), or that all acceptable
vertices are tied. Hence patients with a compatible donor are not considered and
the KE game is identified simply with a digraph G = (V,A) without loops.
Definition 7 A simple KE game is the pair Γ = (V,G), where V is the set of
players and G = (V,A) is a digraph without loops.
Similarly as for the KE game from Definition 1, the solution of a simple KE
game is a permutation pi of V such that i 6= pi(i) implies (i, pi(i)) ∈ A for each
i ∈ V and the notation from Definition 2 can be used. Further, preferences of
players over (player, cycle) pairs now reduce to saying that a player prefers to be
covered to being uncovered, and if covered, he prefers to be in a shorter cycle.
In [15], where dichotomous preferences were considered, the authors allowed
only cycles of length 2. Hence the KE game was represented by an undirected
graph G = (V,E) with ij ∈ E if patient i can accept kidney from donor j and
also conversely. A strongly Pareto optimal solution was identified as a maximum
cardinality matching.
Even without the restriction on cycle lengths, we are able to formulate a
necessary and sufficient condition for a permutation to be in C(Γ).
Theorem 1 pi ∈ C(Γ) if and only if G contains no cycle C = (i1, i2, . . . , ik) such
that |Cpi(ij)| > k or pi(ij) = ij for each j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Proof. Such a cycle clearly blocks pi. On the other hand, if pi /∈ C(Γ) then a
blocking coalition has a form of C.
Theorem 1 suggests an iterative approach for finding a permutation in the
core of the simple KE game. The algorithm is depicted in Figure 2.
Theorem 2 Algorithm CoreSimpleGame correctly finds a permutation in C(Γ)
of the simple KE game in polynomial time.
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Input: A simple KE game Γ = (V,G). Output: A permutation pi of V .
Step 1. Set k := 2 and create the 2-reduced graph G2 = (V2, E2) of digraph G by
letting:
V2 = {v ∈ V : v lies on a 2-cycle in G}, E2 = {e = ij : (i, j) ∈ A & (j, i) ∈ A}.
Find a maximal matching M2 in G2 and set pi(i) = j for each ij ∈M2.
Delete from G all vertices covered by M2.
Step 2. k := k + 1.
Step k. Create the k-reduced digraph Gk = (Vk, Ak) of G by letting:
Vk = {v ∈ V : v lies on a k-cycle in G}, Ak = {e ∈ A : e lies on a k-cycle in G}.
Find a maximal k-cycle packing Mk of Gk and set pi(i) = j for each arc (i, j) ∈Mk.
Delete from G all vertices covered by Mk. If G contains no cycle of length k + 1, end.
Otherwise go to Step 2.
Figure 2: Algorithm CoreSimpleGame
For the strong core, Theorem 1 can be easily modified:
Theorem 3 pi ∈ SC(Γ) if and only if G contains no cycle C = (i1, i2, . . . , ik)
such that either |Cpi(ij)| > k or pi(ij) = ij for at least one j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, and
either |Cpi(il)| ≥ k or pi(il) = il for the remaining vertices il of cycle C.
Corollary 1 If pi ∈ SC(Γ) then pi restricted to the 2-reduced graph G2 is a perfect
matching of V2 and for each k > 2, pi restricted to the k-reduced digraph Gk is a
partition of Vk into directed k-cycles. Consequently, if either G2 admits no perfect
matching or Gk admits no partition of Vk into directed k-cycles for some k, then
SC(Γ) = ∅.
Hence Algorithm CoreSimpleGame could be used to find a permutation in
SC(Γ), if in Step 2 a perfect matching and later a partition of Vk into directed
k-cycles can be found. However, this problem already becomes difficult.
Theorem 4 The problem of deciding whether SC(Γ) = ∅ for a simple KE game
is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership in the class NP follows from Theorem 3. In [8, Theorem
3.7] the NP-completeness of undirected triangle packing is established. It
is easily possible to obtain NP-completeness for directed triangle packing
in graphs with no bidirected arcs, where each vertex lies on a directed triangle,
by considering the reduction constructed there and directing appropriately the
arcs in the graph shown in [8, Figure 3.8].
An instance G = (V,A) of directed triangle packing gives rise to an
instance Γ of a simple KE game. It is then straightforward to verify that G
admits a directed triangle packing if and only if SC(Γ) 6= ∅.
However, in spite of the fact that SPO(Γ) 6= ∅ for all KE games, we have:
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Theorem 5 It is NP-hard to find a permutation in SPO(Γ) for a simple KE
game.
Proof. Suppose we have a polynomial-time algorithm A for finding a permu-
tation in SPO(Γ). Now let G = (V,A) be a directed graph with no bidirected
arcs (given as an instance of directed triangle packing). Run A on G to
find pi ∈ SPO(Γ). If pi contains only 3-cycles then clearly pi gives a directed
triangle packing for G. Now suppose that it is not the case that pi contains only
3-cycles. Suppose for a contradiction that G admits a directed triangle packing.
This defines a permutation σ. Consider any vertex v ∈ V that does not belong
to a 3-cycle in pi (there is at least one such vertex). If v is uncovered by pi then v
improves in σ, since v is covered by σ. Otherwise v belongs to a cycle of length
> 3 in pi and v also improves in σ, since v belongs to a 3-cycle in σ. Hence V
weakly blocks pi via σ, contradicting the assumption that pi ∈ SPO(Γ).
5 Conclusion and open questions
The research on efficient algorithms for kidney exchange problems has just started.
So there are still many questions to be answered and many problems to be solved.
Let us mention just a few directions for possible further research.
• As the basic priority is to treat as many patients as possible, find a solution
of the KE game with the maximum number of covered verties.
• As patients enter and leave the waiting lines unpredictably, explore the
possibilities of on-line algorithms for kidney exchange.
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